To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve

Citation
The Langner Group, To Kill a Centrifuge: A Technical Analysis of What Stuxnet's Creators Tried to Achieve (Nov. 2013) (full-text).

Overview
This document summarizes the most comprehensive research on the Stuxnet malware so far: It combines results from reverse engineering the attack code with intelligence on the design of the attacked plant and background information on the attacked uranium enrichment process. It looks at the attack vectors of the two different payloads contained in the malware and especially provides an analysis of the bigger and much more complex payload that was designed to damage centrifuge rotors by overpressure. With both attack vectors viewed in context, conclusions are drawn about the reasoning behind a radical change of tactics between the complex earlier attack and the comparatively simple later attack that tried to manipulate centrifuge rotor speeds.