Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers

Citation: Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc. 524 F.Supp 171 D.C.Cal., (1981)

Factual Background:

This case is a motion to dismiss Tandy Corporation's (Plaintiff) copyright infringement claim against Personal Micro Computers ("Defendant"). Although plaintiff brought forth five causes of action (copyright infringement, unfair competition under federal and state law, assumpsit, and interference with prospective advantage), Defendant's motion and the scope of this decision is wholly centered on Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim. The infringed work is a computer program affixed on top of a silicon chip as ROM (read-only memory).

Tandy Corp. created a work of software I/O ("input-output routine") which translated high level commands and programing languages to machine code to make their personal computer run, "Radio Shack TRS-80". This software was imprintend permanently on a silicon chip on board TRS-80. Defendant created a computer named "PMC-80" with a similar silicon chip with substantially similar I/O software. Plaintiff's software was copied completely, all but the names of identification "Tandy" and "Radio Shack" were changed.

Chief Judge Peckham held that: (1) a computer program is a “work of authorship” which is subject to copyright and a silicon chip upon which program is imprinted is a “tangible medium of expression” which will subject a program so fixed to copyright laws, and (2) theory that silicon chip upon which properly copyrighted computer program was imprinted was duplicated by first taking a visual display or printout of program, making a copy of that display or printout, and then having program imprinted onto a silicon chip fell within infringement claim based on unauthorized duplication and, if proven, was within reach of federal copyright laws.

Trial Court Proceedings:

Defendant claimed that vague language in 17 U.S.C. Sec. 117 (pre-1980 version) required the court to use the 1909 Copyright Act, instead of the 1976 Copyright Act to determine whether software printed on a ROM chip was a "copy." The court found clear evidence in the legislative history that this section, although intended to revert other sections to their pre 1976 Act counterparts, it was not intended to revert 17 U.S.C. sec. 101 or sec. 102. So the court held that ROM software was copyrightable under the 1976 sec. 102 which held that fixation can occur in “any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 U.S.C. sec. 102(a).

Closer statutory analysis unearthed the limited the scope of sec 117. In reviewing the legislative history of sec. 117, the court found that its intended application was to narrowly address the issue of people imputting literary works such as books, magazines and even software to protect copyrights. Conversely, it found that allowing the bit by bit copying of anothers software, regardless of medium of fixation was a clear misreading of this section, and directly adverse to drafters' intent. ROM copies were held to be tangible mediums of expression, protected by Federal Copyright given a proper reading of sec. 117.

Furthermore, The California District Court rejected following a then recent Illinois District Court case which held against the copyrightability of ROM copies. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D.Ill. 1979). The CA court derided the Ill decision to be unfounded on reason or merit.

Notes:

Plaintiff asserted that Defendant copied the software affixed on the silicon chip by a photochemical method, which essentially means they took a picture of the data and imprinted it onto their chips. The court commented that if this were to be the proven method of copying, Defendant's infringement could be found as a violation of Plaintiffs reproduction rights in a Pictoral/Graphical (visual) work. But the court adverted this line of reasoning because it had already addressed the substantive issues of the motion.