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Since 1980, the courts have analyzed regulations affecting [[advertising]] for commercial products or professional services (i.e., [[commercial speech]]) under the four-part test set forth by the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] in ''Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.''<ref>447 U.S. 557 (1980) ([http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1962482840967580827&q=447+U.S.+557&hl=en&as_sdt=2002 full-text]).</ref> The '''"Central Hudson" test''' asks: |
Since 1980, the courts have analyzed regulations affecting [[advertising]] for commercial products or professional services (i.e., [[commercial speech]]) under the four-part test set forth by the [[U.S. Supreme Court]] in ''Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.''<ref>447 U.S. 557 (1980) ([http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1962482840967580827&q=447+U.S.+557&hl=en&as_sdt=2002 full-text]).</ref> The '''"Central Hudson" test''' asks: |
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:(1) whether the [[speech]] at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; |
:(1) whether the [[speech]] at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; |
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− | :(2) whether the asserted government interest is substantial; and, if so, |
+ | :(2) whether the asserted government interest is substantial; and, if so, |
− | :(3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and |
+ | :(3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and |
:(4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. |
:(4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. |
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In this analysis, the government bears the burden of identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction: “The government is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest — a fit that is not necessarily perfect but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”<ref>''Id.'' at 566.</ref> |
In this analysis, the government bears the burden of identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction: “The government is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest — a fit that is not necessarily perfect but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”<ref>''Id.'' at 566.</ref> |
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[[Category:Advertising]] |
[[Category:Advertising]] |
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[[Category:Free speech]] |
[[Category:Free speech]] |
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+ | [[Category:1980]] |
Revision as of 00:57, 4 January 2014
Overview
Since 1980, the courts have analyzed regulations affecting advertising for commercial products or professional services (i.e., commercial speech) under the four-part test set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York.[1] The "Central Hudson" test asks:
- (1) whether the speech at issue concerns lawful activity and is not misleading;
- (2) whether the asserted government interest is substantial; and, if so,
- (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and
- (4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
In this analysis, the government bears the burden of identifying a substantial interest and justifying the challenged restriction: “The government is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but it must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest — a fit that is not necessarily perfect but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the interest served.”[2]
Moreover, “the four parts of the Central Hudson test are not entirely discrete. All are important and, to a certain extent, interrelated: Each raises a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amendment inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment concerning the other three.”[3]