Citation[edit | edit source]
Overview[edit | edit source]
|“||The most successful method for securing an ICS is to gather industry recommended practices and engage in a proactive, collaborative effort between management, the controls engineer and operator, the IT organization, and a trusted automation advisor.||”|
This document provides guidance for establishing secure industrial control systems (ICS). These ICS, which include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as programmable logic controllers (PLC), are often found in the industrial control sectors. ICS are typically used in industries such as electric, water and wastewater, oil and natural gas, transportation, chemical, pharmaceutical, pulp and paper, food and beverage, and discrete manufacturing (e.g., automotive, aerospace, and durable goods.)
These control systems are vital to the operation of the U.S. critical infrastructures that are often highly interconnected and mutually dependent systems. Approximately 90% of the U.S. critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated. Federal agencies also operate many of the ICS mentioned above; other examples include air traffic control and materials handling (e.g., U.S. Postal Service mail handling.)
This document provides an overview of these ICS and typical system topologies, identifies typical threats and vulnerabilities to these systems, and provides recommended security countermeasures to mitigate the associated risks.
Possible incidents an ICS may face include the following:
- Blocked or delayed flow of information through ICS networks, which could disrupt ICS operation.
- Unauthorized changes to instructions, commands, or alarm thresholds, which could damage, disable, or shut down equipment, create environmental impacts, and/or endanger human life.
- Inaccurate information sent to system operators, either to disguise unauthorized changes, or to cause the operators to initiate inappropriate actions, which could have various negative effects.
- ICS software or configuration settings modified, or ICS software infected with malware, which could have various negative effects.
- Interference with the operation of equipment protection systems, which could endanger costly and difficult-to-replace equipment.
- Interference with the operation of safety systems, which could endanger human life.
References[edit | edit source]
- Id. at 5.