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Under [http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxl_35_U_S_C_100.htm 35 U.S.C. §100(b)], a '''process''' is defined as a: |
Under [http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/appxl_35_U_S_C_100.htm 35 U.S.C. §100(b)], a '''process''' is defined as a: |
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| − | :"process, art or method, and includes a |
+ | :"process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, [[machine]], [[manufacture]], [[composition of matter]], or material." |
"[A] series of steps is a “process” within the meaning of §101 unless it falls within a judicially determined category of [[nonstatutory subject matter]] exceptions."<ref>Ex Parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1988 WL 252338, at *2 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1988).</ref> The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] has held that a [[claim]] is not a patent-eligible “process” if it claims “laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.”<ref>[[Diamond v. Diehr]], 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (''citing'' [[Parker v. Flook]], 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) and [[Gottschalk v. Benson]], 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).</ref> Such fundamental principles are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”<ref>Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); ''see also'' [[LeRoy v. Tatham]], 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”).</ref> “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”<ref>''[[Gottschalk v. Benson|Benson,]]'' 409 U.S. at 67; ''see also'' [[In re Comiskey]], 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “mental processes,” “processes of human thinking,” and “systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone” are not patent-eligible subject matter under ''Benson'').</ref> |
"[A] series of steps is a “process” within the meaning of §101 unless it falls within a judicially determined category of [[nonstatutory subject matter]] exceptions."<ref>Ex Parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1988 WL 252338, at *2 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1988).</ref> The [[U.S. Supreme Court]] has held that a [[claim]] is not a patent-eligible “process” if it claims “laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.”<ref>[[Diamond v. Diehr]], 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (''citing'' [[Parker v. Flook]], 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) and [[Gottschalk v. Benson]], 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).</ref> Such fundamental principles are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”<ref>Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); ''see also'' [[LeRoy v. Tatham]], 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”).</ref> “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”<ref>''[[Gottschalk v. Benson|Benson,]]'' 409 U.S. at 67; ''see also'' [[In re Comiskey]], 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “mental processes,” “processes of human thinking,” and “systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone” are not patent-eligible subject matter under ''Benson'').</ref> |
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Revision as of 05:23, 4 June 2009
Biometrics
The distinguishing characteristics are extracted from the raw biometric sample and processed into a biometric identifier record (sometimes called biometric sample or biometric template).
U.S. Patent Law
Under 35 U.S.C. §100(b), a process is defined as a:
- "process, art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material."
"[A] series of steps is a “process” within the meaning of §101 unless it falls within a judicially determined category of nonstatutory subject matter exceptions."[1] The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a claim is not a patent-eligible “process” if it claims “laws of nature, natural phenomena, [or] abstract ideas.”[2] Such fundamental principles are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men . . . free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”[3] “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”[4]
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "[a] process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing."[5] "Transformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines."[6]
References
- ↑ Ex Parte Murray, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1819, 1988 WL 252338, at *2 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1988).
- ↑ Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978) and Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
- ↑ Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); see also LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852) (“A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.”).
- ↑ Benson, 409 U.S. at 67; see also In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that “mental processes,” “processes of human thinking,” and “systems that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone” are not patent-eligible subject matter under Benson).
- ↑ Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780-787-88 (1877).
- ↑ Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972).